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Abstract
Although intuitively appealing (and common), drawing network strategy implica-
tions from empirical evidence of network performance effects in pooled cross-section is
not necessarily warranted. This is because network positions can influence both the
mean and variance of firm performance. Strategic prescriptions are warranted if empir-
ically observed network effects reflect increases in mean firm performance. If network
effects reflect increases in firm performance variance, however, such prescriptions are
warranted only if the increase in the odds of achieving high performance is sufficient
to compensate for the concomitant increase in the odds of realizing poor performance.
Our simulation study, designed to examine network performance effects in both pooled
cross-section and within-firm over time across a wide range of conditions, counsels cau-
tion in drawing implications for network strategies. We discuss the implications of
our findings for research on network effects, and more broadly for drawing strategic
inferences from studies of firm performance in pooled cross-section.
1 Introduction
At the intersection of network and strategy literatures, researchers are concerned with how
patterns of strategic alliances create network-based advantages for well-connected firms. Re-
searchers have examined whether firms should occupy densely interconnected “closed” net-
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work positions, which afford coordination and integration benefits by facilitating the ease of
exchange and commonness of information among firms (Coleman, 1988, 1990), or in sparsely
interconnected “open” network positions, which confer information access and control ben-
efits through conveyance of diverse information and resources and brokerage opportunities
(Burt, 1992, 2000; Granovetter, 1973).
Despite empirical evidence remaining somewhat equivocal, the idea of “network effects”
on firm performance is by now uncontroversial, and attention focused increasingly on the
identification of conditions under which open or closed network positions are more or less
advantageous (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2010; Burt 1998, 2000; Rowley et al., 2000).
What remains uncertain, however, is whether the evidence of “network effects” supports
commonly inferred prescriptions for “network strategy,” where the former is typically based
on empirical estimates from panel or pooled time-series-and-cross-section data showing that
firms occupying a particular type of network position at time t outperform firms that do
not at time t + 1, and the latter is based on the inference that firms sustaining the type of
network position shown to be beneficial in pooled cross-section, will outperform those that
do not over the longer term.
Although such an inference is intuitively appealing, the implications of network effects
in cross-section do not translate straightforwardly into implications for sustained network
strategy. This is because network positions can affect both the mean and variance of firm
performance outcomes, which play distinct roles in competition for high performance (March,
1991). If a network position increases both the mean and variance of performance, the firm
gains a performance advantage over its rivals. A network position advantage may also be
gained if the increase in performance variance is sufficient to compensate for a decrease in
mean performance, and vice versa. When competition is for primacy at a given point in
time, increasing the variance, rather than the mean, of performance contributes increasingly
to competitive advantage as the number of competitors increases (March, 1991).
But increased performance variance also exposes firms to a greater risk of very poor perfor-
mance, and, as a result, the benefit of increasing firm performance variance depends impor-
tantly on the distribution of possible performance outcomes. The likelihood of achieving high
performance, in particular, depends on the right-hand tail of the performance distribution;
the left-hand tail is critical to experiencing poor performance. If the distribution is right
skewed, with only a small number of high-performance outcomes available relative to poor
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ones, increasing performance variance improves a firm’s chances of achieving one of the high
outcomes, but the increased odds may be to too small to compensate for the reduction in
the mean that results from the concomitantly higher odds of obtaining poor outcomes.
The implication of these observations is consequential: if empirical evidence of network
effects in pooled cross-section reflects the influence of firms’ network positions at time t on the
variance, rather than the mean, of their performance at time t+1, whether network positions
associated with high performance in cross-section may also prove beneficial if sustained over
time depends on whether the increased odds of achieving high performance are nullified by
a concomitant rise in the risk of experiencing poor outcomes.
Three factors suggest both that empirical findings for network effects plausibly reflect per-
formance variance (rather than mean) effects and that such nullification is therefore likely.
One is that empirical studies of network effects model the role of network position in achiev-
ing high performance in pooled cross-section, which is governed by performance variance,
rather than avoiding low performance, which is governed by mean performance (March,
1991). A second is the commonly observed right-skewness of firm performance distributions
(e.g., Adriani and McKelvey, 2009; Powell, 2003), which suggest that increased performance
variance may often raise firms’ risk of low performance more than their chances of achiev-
ing high performance, and thus reduce their mean performance. The third is that analyses
of performance in pooled cross-section are informed by performance variation across rather
than within firms, and thus indifferent to which particular firm performs well in each cross
section. As a result, while firms occupying a particular type of network position may tend to
achieve high performance in any given cross section, it may be different firms achieving the
high performance in each instance.
In this paper, we assess the extent to which network strategies can be inferred from network
effects empirically observed in pooled cross-section. We focus on firm performance effects
of open and closed network positions, both because they are the main focus of influential
contemporary empirical work on network effects, and because of their distinct performance
implications. In particular, recent empirical research (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000) suggests that open network positions facilitate exploratory
(non-local) search, which increases firms’ performance variance, while closed network posi-
tions facilitate exploitive (local) search, which lowers firms’ performance variance (Holland,
1975; March, 1991).
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Our approach is simulation based. This approach allows us to examine performance in both
pooled cross-section and within-firm over time across a wide range of skewness of possible
performance outcomes. Our simulation model is designed to characterize innovation networks
and outcomes, for which the role of strategic alliances in the acquisition of external knowledge
is well established (Powell et al., 1996; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf and Nerkar,
2001), exploitation and exploration activities are highly germane (Gilsing et al., 2008; Lavie
and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000), network effects have
been an important focus of research (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 2005; Rowley et al.,
2000), and distributions of possible performance outcome are known to be variously skewed
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
After developing our theoretical predictions regarding firms’ network positions and perfor-
mance variation more fully, we describe and validate our simulation model, demonstrating
that, across a wide range of distributions of possible firm performance, the model replicates
both the properties of “real world” networks, as well as network effects on performance in
pooled cross-section that mirror those obtained in empirical network studies. Subsequently,
we turn our attention to network strategies, and specifically, to the questions of 1) whether
network positions associated with high performance in pooled cross-section are also beneficial
when sustained in the long run, and 2) how the skewness of distributions of possible firm
performance impacts the veracity of conclusions for network strategy drawn from network
effects observed in pooled cross-section.
2 Network position and performance
Although network theorists agree that “better-connected” firms gain a competitive advan-
tage, there is disagreement regarding what “better-connected” actually means. Coleman’s
(1988) closure argument implies that firms are better off occupying densely interconnected,
closed network positions in which their partners are also partners. Burt’s (1992) structural
hole argument, in contrast, prescribes that firms embed themselves in sparsely connected,
open network positions comprised of disconnected partners. Rather than arguing the supe-
riority of one network position over the other, Burt (1998, p. 45) suggests a contingency
approach to reconcile this disagreement: “Closure and hole arguments are not as contradic-
tory as they might seem... The ambiguity stems in large part from the different roles that
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social capital plays in the study populations with which each is justified.” Open and closed
network positions afford distinct benefits that are useful for different purposes, and under-
standing their effects requires consideration of the conditions under which firms benefit from
possessing the distinct benefits they afford.
Consistent with Burt’s (1998) view, recent studies have pursued contingency approaches
in which the benefits of open and closed network positions depend on environmental condi-
tions and task purposes (Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000).
These approaches conceive the appropriate type of network position to depend on their dif-
ferential value for exploitive and exploratory learning modes. That is, the degree to which
firms are focused on exploiting existing technologies, skills, and information, or exploring the
environment for emerging innovations and other significant changes.
Exploitation involves using existing knowledge to improve organizational functioning by re-
ducing variability in the quality or efficiency of current strategies, competencies, technologies
and procedures. In exploitation, the emphasis is on refining existing knowledge by gathering
specific information that will provide deeper understanding in a particular area. The solution
space is thus well defined, and search is local and highly specific. The classic exemplar is the
well-known “experience curve” phenomenon in which firms reduce production cost and/or
time by eliminating redundancies and inefficiencies through continuous tuning of internal
practices and processes (Yelle, 1979; Argote, 1993). Exploration, in contrast, entails pro-
cesses of concerted variation and experimentation to identify new ways of doing things and
new things to do. Because the focus is on gathering information and identifying emerging
innovations and alternative future options, in exploration, the solution space is ill-defined,
search is wide, and a premium is placed on newer, more diverse information.
March (1991) views both processes as essential, but observes that firms face a trade-off
between how much to invest in refining existing technologies to stay competitive in their
current markets in the short term, compared to developing new knowledge about novel tech-
nologies with which to compete over the long term as environmental demands change. The
balance of resources firms allocate to exploitation and exploration thus tends to depend on
environmental conditions (Lant et al., 1992; Rowley et al., 2000). Environmental uncertainty,
in particular, by affecting the predictability and frequency of change (Dess and Beard, 1984),
influences the degree to which firms must emphasize refinement of existing knowledge and/or
seek out new opportunities. In uncertain environments firms must allocate more resources
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to exploration than in stabler environments in which there is greater clarity about future
directions and fewer environmental disturbances.
The distinct information requirements of exploitation and exploration suggest different pre-
scriptions regarding appropriate network position (Gilsing et al., 2008; Rowley et al., 2000).
Open network positions, comprised of disconnected, non-redundant partners, are ideal for
gaining access to diverse sources of information and knowledge, to facilitate identification of
emerging opportunities and threats, and location of complementary knowledge (Powell et al.,
1996; Mitsuhashi, 2003). Open network positions thus afford a firm unique information and
perspectives from each of its partners that facilitates broad search for emerging innovations
and alternative future options. In uncertain environments requiring large investments in
exploration, sparsely connected, open network positions are therefore expected to be advan-
tageous. Closed network positions, by contrast, inhibit firms’ access to broader, divergent,
distant, and less familiar approaches critical to exploration (Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Although
this limits their usefulness in meeting the demands of uncertain environments, the access
to redundant and validating information they afford is essential to meeting the information
requirements of exploitation (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Van de Ven, 1976; Walker et al., 1997).
The ability to triangulate across multiple, redundant sources enhances evaluation of acquired
information obtained from each source, aiding in refinement of existing knowledge. In stable,
certain environments requiring large investments in exploitation, closed network positions
are thus expected to be advantageous.
Combined, the previous arguments offer clear predictions regarding the value of open and
closed network positions: Firms operating in a rapidly changing environment are expected
to benefit from open network positions facilitating exploration, while firms in a stable envi-
ronment are expected to benefit from closed network positions facilitating exploitation.
To this point, we have grounded our discussion in social networks literature. Similar pre-
dictions follow, however, from March’s (1991) reasoning on firm strategies that change the
mean and/or variance of their performance distributions. The starting point for March’s
argument is a very general one: when observing a population of firms at any point in time,
the highest performing firms will tend to be those having the highest variance performance
distribution. Thus in cross-section, the correlation between firm performance and variance-
increasing strategies will tend to be positive. Moreover, as the aggregate, population-level
performance distribution becomes more right-skewed, this correlation should tend to increase.
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To see this, consider Figure 1. As the figure shows, holding mean performance in the pop-
ulation constant, increasing the right skew of the population-level performance distribution
raises both the density of the right tail and the mass near zero. As a result, increasing the
skew of possible population-level performance outcomes also increases the odds that high
performance variance firms are the best performers in the population.
Performance
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Figure 1: Showing the effects of increasing skewness of population-level performance distri-
butions. Log-normal distributions with constant mean (of 1, shown by the vertical line) and
increasing both variance and skewness moving from thick black to thin black to grey.
In a network context, open positions represent variance-increasing strategies (Burt, 1992).
Consequently, as the probability of occasional, very large, disruptive innovations (and thus the
right-skewness of the population-level performance distribution) increases, the performance
of firms occupying open network positions should increase in pooled cross-section. By the
same logic, as the probability of such large, disruptive innovations falls, and innovation in
the population becomes largely incremental, the performance of firms occupying variance-
reducing closed network positions should increase in cross-section. These predictions match
both theoretical arguments and empirical findings in pooled cross-section studies of network
effects (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Gilsing et al., 2008; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rowley et al.,
2000).
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Now, rather than in cross-section, consider the longer-term implications of firms attempting
to strategically manipulate the moments of their performance distributions over time via their
network positions. Variance-increasing open network positions raise both the value of the
firm’s high performance outcomes and lower the value of its poor performance outcomes. The
implications of these two effects for a firm’s long-run performance depend on the skewness
of the aggregate, population-level performance distribution. As illustrated above in Figure
1, holding mean performance constant, increasing skewness raises both the right tail density
and the mass of very poor outcomes. As a result, when the skew of the population-level
performance distribution is low, high firm-level performance variance improves a firm’s odds
of very good outcomes, but not of very poor outcomes given their relatively small frequency.
As the skew of the aggregate performance distribution increases, however, a high variance
firm strategy raises not only the odds of very good outcomes, but also, increasingly, of
very poor outcomes. In contrast, while a low variance firm strategy does not increase the
odds of very good outcomes, it does afford protection against very poor outcomes. The
long-term effect of sustaining open and closed network positions on firm performance should
thus depend on the skewness of the population-level performance distribution. Specifically,
the long-term performance of firms sustaining open network positions should decline with
the right-skewness of the population-level performance distribution, while, oppositely, the
long-term performance of firms sustaining closed network positions should increase with the
right-skewness of the population-level performance distribution. Table 1 summarizes our
theoretical predictions. Note that the predictions are opposite not only between open and
closed network positions, but also for performance in cross-section and over time within each
network position, complicating inferences for firm strategy from evidence in pooled cross-
section.
Network Effect on Performance in Performance
position firm perf. cross-section over time
Closed Variance Decreases with skewness of Increases with skewness of
decreasing population-level perf. distribution population-level perf. distribution
Open Variance Increases with skewness of Decreases with skewness of
increasing population-level perf. distribution population-level perf. distribution
Table 1: Predictions of firm performance effects of open and closed network positions in
different environments.
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3 Model
In this section we develop a model aimed at elaborating the arguments presented above.
Although many strategies likely affect the variance of firm performance, here we focus on
network strategies, drawing inspiration from the extensive literature on the sources of value
of open and closed network positions. We also follow this literature in framing our model in
the context of firms allying in order to innovate, and formalize the exploration-exploitation
spectrum by focusing on the properties of innovations that take place. Specifically, we assume
that an exploitation environment, innovations tend to be of similar importance, and thus we
can see innovation “size” as being drawn from a distribution with relatively low skewness.
However, in an exploration environment, there can be wide differences in the effects of in-
novations; most are small, and have little impact, but when a large innovation does arrive,
it can be highly disruptive. With this formalism we capture very simply the effects of the
population-level technological environment as it favors exploration or exploitation as means
of successful innovation.
3.1 Sketch of the model
We first describe the model verbally, and then specify the formalization we use in implemen-
tation.
Firms ally for the purpose of innovating and in so doing they create an industry network.
Three forces shape the evolution of that network.
The first is the process of alliance formation. Firms form alliances with the goal of creating
innovations, and for any firm, each alliance represents one R&D project.1 An alliance is in
essence an institution for knowledge sharing, so a firm forms an alliance with another firm
in order to access the knowledge it needs to (potentially) make that project successful. The
need to have complementary knowledge for successful innovation implies that partners will be
neither too close together nor too far apart in knowledge space, and the probability that a firm
succeeds through a particular alliance is a positive, single-peaked function of the distance in
knowledge space from the firm to its partner in that alliance. Because the knowledge space
is a metric space, this need for proximity will induce some amount of local correlation in
the decisions to ally, yielding both repetition and cliquish-ness in firms’ partnering decisions
1For simplicity, we assume that firms undertake no R&D outside alliances.
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(Baum et al., 2010).
The second force shaping the alliance network is learning. When two firms ally, they learn
from each other, and so move closer together in knowledge space. This can affect their
suitability as partners in subsequent periods.
The third, and most important, driving force in the model is innovation. When a firm
produces an innovation, it disrupts the activities of all other (non-innovating) firms. In
response, firms rearrange their activities by deploying different knowledge than they did
before the innovation. An innovation thus changes the value of the knowledge stocks of other
firms; and it changes the value of partnerships between firms (represented by their specific
knowledge endowments). We compress this into a single action, in which non-innovating firms
are relocated in knowledge space, thereby changing the value of their (potential) partnerships,
and the innovating firm (if any) receives a value equal to the total displacement of other firms
in knowledge space. As a consequence, firms can calculate the expected benefit of any possible
alliance as the product of its success probability and the total dislocation the firm can expect
to impose on other firms in the industry, minus alliance cost. Alliances form when expected
profits are positive for both partners.
In each period all actual and potential alliances are (re)evaluated. If a potential alliance
shows positive expected profits it forms, or is maintained. If an existing alliance shows
negative expected profits it is terminated. Combined, the decisions of firms to ally with
profitable partners, their learning from one another, and their dislocation in knowledge space
in response to innovations produce networks that exhibit features common to “real world”
networks. In the following sections we operationalize these assumptions, taking each element
of the process individually.
3.2 Firms and the arrival of innovations
A fixed, finite population of N firms is located in a 2-dimensional metric knowledge space,
which we take to be unit square [0, 1]2, with periodic structure (i.e. a torus). Each firm is
characterized by a knowledge endowment, vi = (vi,1, vi,2), fori = 1, ..., N , which defines its
location in knowledge space.
We treat innovations as stochastic, and independent across firms. Each firm engages in
knowledge sharing with each of its alliance partners, and each alliance formed by the focal
firm contributes additively to the probability that this firm succeeds in this period. The
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marginal contribution of a particular alliance to the firm’s project portfolio is its success
rate, which in turns depends on the characteristics of the alliance.
Specifically, the success rate for any alliance depends of the “goodness of fit” of the alliance,
which is assumed to be a single-peaked function of the Euclidean distance (with a maximum at
finite distance d∗) between the alliance partners in knowledge space.2 Formally, we employ
a bell-shaped (Gaussian) function to map knowledge-distance to one-period success rates,
according to
λij ≡ f(dij) = λ¯e−[(dij−d∗)/σ]2 , (1)
where dij is the distance in knowledge space between i and j,
dij =
[∑
`=1,2
(1/2− |1/2− |vi,` − vj,`||)2
]1/2
, (2)
and λ¯ 1 is a scaling parameter which we use to control the maximum success probability.
Firm i’s overall success rate is λi =
∑
ij∈g λij, where g is the network of existing alliances
during the period we consider. The population-level arrival rate of innovations is λ =
∑N
i=1 λi.
Provided success rates are small enough (λij ≤ λ¯  1 ), any firm’s overall success rate λi
is also small, and thus the population-wide arrival rate of innovations λ is less than one, in
which case at most one firm succeeds in any period. We impose parameter values such that
this constraint is satisfied.
3.3 Dislocation following an innovation
Following an innovation, the knowledge landscape changes, altering the value of different
types of knowledge and different knowledge combinations. We assume that an innovation by
firm i disrupts the status quo for all other firms. Firms respond by deploying new knowledge
in their activities, and so an innovation changes both where firms are located in space and
which combinations of knowledge are valuable. The extent to which a non-innovating firm is
2Empirical studies have shown, in a variety of contexts, that alliance and merger success is driven by
partners’ relative knowledge endowments. This is commonly formalized using “distance in knowledge space”,
which is measured in a variety of ways. Additionally, recent work has shown that the probability that a
pair of firms forms an alliance is concave in their distance in knowledge space (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001;
Mowery et al., 1996, 1998; Mueller et al., 2009; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Schoenmakers and Duysters,
2006; Stuart, 1998).
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affected by an innovation is determined both by its proximity to the innovating firm, and by
the size of the innovation. We operationalize this by assuming that following an innovation,
firms are dislocated in the knowledge space. More precisely, following an innovation by firm
i, firm i itself is not moved but all other firms are dislocated as a function of their distance
to i in knowledge space.
Any firm j is relocated, uniformly at random within a disk centered on j’s pre-innovation
location. The disk has radius
rj = θ · rmax(1−
√
2dij), (3)
where rmax is the maximum possible dislocation,
√
2/2 is the maximum possible distance
between firms and θ measures the size of the innovation. Firms are affected by an innovation
as a linear function of their distances to the innovating firm. The magnitude of this distance
effect, however, depends on the size of the innovation, θ. Innovation size is treated as a
positive, multiplicative shock, drawn from a binary random variable with expectation equal
to 1 and variance and skewness which we control with the parameter s. By changing the
skew of the innovation size distribution, we control the nature of the technological regime in
which firms operate, and thus the skew of the population-level performance distribution.
Define realized dislocation of firm j as δj.
3 Total dislocation from an innovation is thus
given by
Vi =
∑
j 6=i
δj. (4)
The expected magnitude of the dislocation of firm j being rj/2, total expected dislocation,
used by firms to calculate expected values of an alliance, is
E [Vi] =
∑
j 6=i
E [rj] = E [θ] ·
∑
j 6=i
rj/2 =
∑
j 6=i
rj/2. (5)
3.4 Strategic alliance formation
The value to firm i of a particular alliance ij is the marginal contribution of that particular
alliance to the firm’s expected profit, net of alliance cost c. The marginal contribution of
3In terms of implementation, the direction of motion of firm j is an angle drawn uniformly at random in
[0, 2pi); distance of dislocation of j, δj , is drawn from a uniform distribution U [0, rj ].
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alliance ij to the success rate of firm i is λij.
4 If i innovates, the value of that innovation
is the sum of the dislocations it imposes on all other firms, as in Equation 4. We can thus
write the expected value of alliance ij to firm i as
piiji = λij · E [Vi]− c, (6)
the product of λij, the marginal contribution of alliance ij to the success rate of firm i, and
the dislocation i expects to impose on other firms, net of alliance cost c.
An alliance will form if expected profits are positive to both partnering firms. Rewriting,
the alliance (formation or continuation) condition is thus
λij · E [Vi] ≥ c and λij · E [Vj] ≥ c. (7)
3.5 Learning
If firms i and j ally, they learn from each other, and so move closer together in knowledge
space.5 We model this as a linear partial adjustment process
vt+1i,1 = αv
t
j,1 + (1− α) vti,1 and vt+1i,2 = αvtj,2 + (1− α) vti,2, (8)
where parameter α ∈ (0, 1/2) measures absorptive capacity in the industry.
In each period the industry network thus consists of the alliances formed by all firm pairs
satisfying the condition in Equation 7. However, in a dynamic industry, we observe that
knowledge portfolios, alliances and the industry network all change over time. At the pop-
ulation level, the industry network structure is determined by (current) knowledge stocks
of the firms in it. But the network structure is instrumental in the innovation within the
industry. Innovations force firms to respond, and to redeploy their knowledge, possibly using
different knowledge in reaction to the new market conditions created by the innovation. Thus
innovations change firms’ position in the knowledge space, by forcing them to use different
knowledge than they had done previously. So at the population-level, network structure and
industry knowledge profile co-evolve. In the sections that follow, we explore this co-evolution
4We assume that innovations do not compete in any after-market, so firms can treat each alliance decision
independently from all others, both their own and other firms’.
5This feature of alliances has been documented by Mowery et al., 1998; Uzzi, 1997.
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through numerical simulation of the model.
4 Numerical implementation of the model
The single period outcome of the model is easily characterized. There is a unique (pairwise
stable) equilibrium in which all pairs of firms ij and only those pairs such that the condition
in Equation 7 holds form (or continue) an alliance. Over time however, the model being one
of of complex co-evolution, its behavior does not lend itself to analytical solution. We resort
to numerical simulation, with the following settings.
We consider a population of N = 100 firms, and use as the knowledge space the unit torus.
Thus each firm’s knowledge endowment is a pair of positive real numbers, 0 ≤ vi,1, vi,2 ≤ 1, for
all i = 1, . . . , 100. At the outset, all firms hold knowledge endowments distributed uniformly
over the unit torus. We set the optimal distance to d∗ = 0.025.6 We set σ, the parameter that
governs how fast success probabilities fall as firm-pairs deviate from the optimal distance, at
0.025. This implies we are quite demanding in terms of being close to the optimal distance:
two firms located on top of each other would only have a success rate of roughly one third of
the maximum success rate λ¯. The upper bound to the success rate of an alliance (which is
achieved when participants are at the optimal distance) is λ¯ = 0.004, as visible in Equation
1. The maximum possible dislocation following an innovation is 0.05. Absorptive capacity,
α = 0.01. The cost of forming and maintaining an alliance is set to c = 0.000001.
These parameters produce a reasonably dense network of average degree near five (i.e., a
density of roughly 5%), and an industry-wide arrival rate of innovations of about 0.3 (i.e., on
average one innovation every third period). The network is sparse enough for network-effects
to materialize, and the arrival rate of innovation is low enough to keep inertia in the network.
Numerous explorations around the values we use here have no produced significant variation
in the nature of the results.
Finally, we control the nature of the innovation regime using the log-normal distribution
from which the innovation size is drawn (Section 3.2). For each innovation, size (θ) is drawn
independently from a binary random variable taking the value s with probability 1/ (s+ 1)
and the value 1/s with probability s/ (s+ 1), with s ≥ 1. Then we get E [θ] = 1 and
6We set d∗ to a small value because we have in mind a very broadly defined industry such that of
absorptive capacity and the need for novelty, the two forces generally taken to combine to produce the
inverted-U relationship, absorptive capacity dominates.
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V [θ] = (s− 1)2 /s, which is a mean-preserving multiplicative random shock that we use
to control the variance, skewness and higher moments of the innovation size, and thus,
population-level performance distribution. We generate 500 random values of s ∈ [1, 30],
each with equal mean innovation size/firm performance.
The experiment is run by initializing the firms’ knowledge endowments uniformly at ran-
dom over the unit torus. Alliances form each period according to the condition in equation 7.
Innovations arrive randomly, determined by the independent Poisson processes of the set of
alliances as described in Subsection 3.2. We discard the initial 500 periods, to avoid any pos-
sible spurious effects arising from the initialization, and run the alliance formation/innovation
process for 10,000 periods. We repeat this for 500 different values of s ∈ [1, 30].
5 Results
We examine some aggregate properties of the alliance network, before turning to a more
detailed analysis of the relationship between position and performance.
5.1 The network: snapshots and dynamics
As a first step in the analysis, we display in Figure 2 two representative networks captured
in period t = 1000 in two runs of the model, one having a low skewness of the innovation
size distribution (left panel, s = 2), the other having high skewness (right panel, s = 30).
Standard network descriptive statistics are given.
Here we obtain a first intuition about the effect that the skewness in the innovation size
distribution has on network structure. This effect is dynamic rather than static. Indeed,
at any point in time, firms make alliance decisions based on expected profits, disregarding
higher moments of the innovation size distribution. So for given firm locations, the alliance
formation decisions are independent from θ (recall that mean innovation size remain constant
across values of s). However, innovation interacts with learning. Over time, the effect of the
latter is to bring firms closer in knowledge space. The low-skew innovation regime (s = 2)
has frequent innovation of roughly constant magnitude (θ), counter-balancing the effect of
learning in terms of increasing the clustering of firms in knowledge space. The high-skew
regime (s = 30), in contrast, has many very small innovations whose effect is nullified by
learning, and only rarely large ones. So most often in time, firms will be closer in knowledge
15
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Figure 2: Two representative networks for low-skew (left panel, s = 2) and high-skew (right
panel, s = 30) innovation distributions at period t = 1000. The network on the left panel
(right panel) is characterized by: average degree: 3.78 (5.84); average clustering: 0.73 (0.87);
average betweenness: 17.16 (8.3); average constraint: 0.65 (0.54); average distance among
reachable pairs: 3.25 (2.30); number of connected components: 10 (15).
space in a highly skewed regime, with higher average degree and clustering, and consequently
more connected components and shorter distance among reachable pairs (within the smaller,
denser components).
These intuitions are confirmed by Figure 3, which displays average degree and average
clustering for the final 500 periods of two representative histories of the network, one for low-
skew (left panel, s = 2) and the other for a high-skew (right panel, s = 30) innovation regimes.
As firms ally, learn, innovate and are dislocated by others’ innovations, the distribution of
firms over the knowledge space changes, and so the alliances formed change. This implies a
co-evolution between knowledge endowments and network behavior.
In both cases we observe that network activity (degree and clustering) rises and falls over
time, however, the patterns are differ markedly for low and high-skew innovation regimes.
In the low-skew regime, fluctuations are homogeneous over time. In the high-skewed regime,
there is in general very little movement from one period to the next, and the effect of learning
dominates. Firms in a given connected component get closer in knowledge space, forming
more alliances (also among partners of a given firm) as global convergence takes place toward
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Figure 3: Time series of average degree and average clustering for low-skew (s = 2, left panel)
and high-skew (s = 30, right panel) innovation distributions.
the center of gravity of the set of connected firms. Innovation size (θ), is typically so small
that their effect is overwhelmed by the learning process. But, infrequently, a very large,
disruptive innovation occurs, and dislocates many firms. Degree and clustering then fall
significantly, before routinized learning again takes command.
We can use this observation to address the interpretation of the parameter θ given above.
We would expect in an era or industry where exploitation dominates that each period there
is some small innovation. Most innovation attempts are successful and of comparable impor-
tance. In a period of exploration, however, we would expect that most innovation attempts
are relatively unsuccessful. Every now and then, however, there will be a success, and it can
be big enough to cause major disruptions in the industry.
5.2 Network position and performance
Our overarching concern is whether prescriptions for firm strategy can be derived straight-
forwardly from empirical findings in pooled cross-section. In the context of interfirm alliance
networks, this is framed in terms of open versus closed network positions. In this section we
tackle this issue directly. There are two ways to think about the relationship between firms’
network positions and their performance. In the first, the locus is the innovation: what de-
termines the size of an innovation? This is the pooled cross-section approach. In the second,
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the locus is the firm: what determines the size of a firm’s innovative performance? This is the
within-firm, over time approach, which is relevant for strategic prescriptions. We ask both
questions and examine whether the answers are consistent with or, as we predict, opposite
to, each other, and thus whether or not evidence of network effects in pooled cross-section
data supports prescriptions for network strategy over time.
For comprehensiveness, we do this with two alternative measures. Node betweenness is
a direct measure of the openness of a network position.7 Betweenness is large when a firm
connects two otherwise disconnected (or very distant) parts of a network. Such a firm occupies
a fairly unique, open position in terms of accessing and controlling access to a broad set of
diverse resources. Low betweenness, by contrast, signals a more common structural position
where the source of social capital is redundancy and commonality of neighbors. A firm
with low betweenness occupies a closed network position. An alternative, direct measure of
closure is constraint.8 Constraint increases when the degree of the focal firm decreases, when
the number of distance-two neighbors decreases, and when the clustering of the focal firm’s
neighborhood increases (Burt, 1992). We use both measures and observe the consistency of
our results.
Earlier, we argued that in pooled cross-section open network positions would become more
beneficial to firms as the skew of the distribution of possible performance outcomes increased,
whereas over time the opposite would hold. We assess the veracity of this prediction by ex-
amining the correlation between firms’ betweenness and innovation size. To observe network
effects in pooled cross-section, each time there a firm innovates, we record the profits of the
innovating firm (i.e., total dislocation imposed on other firms minus the cost of its alliance
portfolio this period), and the betweenness of the innovating firm. We thus have innovation-
centric data. To observe “network strategy” effects, we follow each firm over its entire history,
and at the end of the simulation record, for each firm, total profits over this history (i.e., the
total dislocations it has imposed on other firms through its innovations minus the total cost it
has incurred in making alliances), and the average of its betweenness measured every period.
Here we have firm-centric data. Correlations between innovation size and betweenness on
the one hand, and total profits and betweenness on the other allow us to compare pooled
7Betweenness centrality of firm i, bi, is the sum, over all possible pairs k, l ∈ N − {i}, of the proportion
pk,i,l of shortest paths between k and l that run through i, i.e., bi =
∑
k,l 6=i pk,i,l.
8Constraint of firm i, Ci is defined as Ci =
∑
j 6=i
∑
q 6=i,j(ai,j + ai,qaq,j)
2, where ai,j = 1 if i and j have
an alliance and 0 otherwise.
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cross-section and within-firm long-run relationships. To observe how these relationships are
affected by the skewness of possible performance outcomes, we use as the abscissa the ob-
served skew of the population-level performance distribution. That is, for each value of the
parameter s, which controls the innovation size distribution, at the end of each simulation
run, we calculate the skew of the distribution of observed firm profits. We display Spearman
correlations against this variable in the left panel of Figure 4.
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Cross−section
Strategy
Figure 4: The relationship between betweenness and performance in cross-section and over
time, by skewness of the observed distribution of firm profits. Left panel shows correlations
between profit and betweenness; right panel displays t-statistics (means over standard errors
of differences) of above and below median firm profits, for cross-section ranked by innovation
size, for strategy ranked by firm average betweenness over time.
To provide an alternate view of the results, we present the data a second way. The cross-
section analysis essentially asks about innovations: “What are the properties of big (versus
small) innovations?” By contrast, the strategy analysis asks about firms: “What is the
performance of high (versus low) betweenness firms?” We can address those questions directly
by comparing large and small innovations, or open-positioned and close-positioned firms. In
the first instance, we compare the betweenness of the top and bottom halves of the innovation
size distributions. In the second instance we compare total profits for the top and bottom
halves of the population of firms ranked by betweenness. To perform these comparisons and
assess their statistical significance, we use a simple difference of means test. We report the
value of the t-statistic, which is the number of standard errors by which the two sample means
are separated. A value of the t-statistic outside (approximately) [−2, 2] means rejection of
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the null hypothesis that the two sample means are the same. We display t-statistics against
the observed skew of the observed distribution of firm profits on the right panel of Figure 4.
What we observe in the left panel of Figure 4 is that, in pooled cross-section, open network
positions are positively correlated with firm performance. Further, this correlation increases
in magnitude with the skewness of the population-level distribution of observed firm profits.
By comparison, in the long run, while the correlation is positive for low-skew profit distri-
butions, it falls as the skewness of firm profits increases, and becomes negative when skew is
high. The right panel, displaying the difference of means test for of top-versus-bottom halves
of the population, tells the same story. In cross-section, with innovation-centric data, there
is clearly a statistical difference: large innovations are strongly associated with firms holding
open positions (as measured by betweenness) and this association grows as the skewness of
firm profits increases. Over the long run, using firm-centric data, though, effects are less
clear. Statistically, it would be difficult to argue that high-profit firms have more or less
open positions than closed-position firms. We note, though, that if there is a trend, the ef-
fect of population-level performance skewness on the relationship between open positions and
profit is of opposite sign to that seen in cross-section. Consistent with the predictions above,
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Figure 5: The relationship between constraint and performance in cross-section and over
time, by skewness of the observed distribution of firm profits. Left panel shows correlations
between profit and constraint; right panel displays t-statistics (means over standard errors
of differences) of above and below median firm profits, for cross-section ranked by innovation
size, for strategy ranked by firm average constraint over time.
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then, the results indicate that the effects of network position on firm performance in pooled
cross-section and over time are contradictory, and that evidence of network effects in pooled
cross-section data does not straightforwardly support prescriptions for network strategy over
time.
To examine the effects of closed positions directly, we replicate the analysis using constraint
rather than betweenness to measure firms’ network positions. The results, presented in Figure
5 are analogous to those found in Figure 4 for betweenness. The left panel shows correlations
between performance and constraint, plotted against the skewness of the population-level
profit distribution. The right panel shows t-statistics for the difference in means: in pooled
cross-section we compare the constraint of the top and bottom halves of the innovation size
distributions; for the long run, we compare total profits for the top and bottom halves of the
population of firms ranked by constraint. As expected, the correlation patterns are reversed
from those for betweenness. And, again, the results are consistent with our theoretical
predictions.
These simulation results are consistent with the link drawn between network positions and
learning modes suggesting that closed positions reduce firm performance variation, while
open positions increase it. To assess the alignment of this characterization with the outcomes
experienced by our simulated firms, we computed correlations of firms’ profit variance with
betweenness and constraint. To observe how these relationships are affected by the skewness
of the population-level performance distribution, we again use the skew of the observed
distribution of firm profits as the abscissa. The correlations are presented in Figure 6.
The left panel shows that the correlation between firm profit variance and betweeness
is positive but decreasing as the skewness of the observed firm performance distribution
increases initially, and stabilizes at 0 for skewness> 3. The right panel shows that the
correlation between firm profit variance and constraint, oppostively, is negative but increasing
as the skew of the observed firm profit distribution increases initially, and stabilizes at 0 for
skewness> 3. Thus, for skewness< 3 the profit variance correlations are consistent with
the theoretical expectation that closed positions, characterized by high constraint, lower
firm performance variance, while open positions, characterized by high betweeness, raise it.
For skewness> 3, the disruptiveness of the innovation regime (controlled by the parameter
s ∈ [1, 30]) results in all firms experiencing similar performance variance and this reduces
the correlations with network position to zero. Firms’ profit variance converge as s increases
21
because the probability of large innovations of size s, 1/ (s+ 1), declines, while the probability
of small innovations of size 1/s, s/ (s+ 1), increases. The result is that innovations of size
1/s become more frequent, but are too small to differentiate the profitability of innovators
from non-innovators, while innovations of size s become large, but are too infrequent to
differentiate the profitability of firms over time.
6 Discussion and conclusion
We have observed substantial discrepancies in correlations between network position and
performance in pooled cross-section and within-firm, over time, and as a result, prescriptions
drawn from the two types of correlations would be very different under some conditions.
We have advanced an explanation that resides in the nature of performance benefits firms
derive from their network positions. And, in particular, whether network positions affect
firm performance through its mean or variance.
Open network positions facilitate broad search for emerging innovations and future options
vital to exploratory search (Powell et al., 1996). Closed network positions, yield access to the
redundant and validating information essential to exploitive search (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Appropriate network positions thus depend on the degree of uncertainty and rate of change
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Figure 6: The relationships of variance in firm profits with betweenness and constraint by
skewness of the observed distribution of firm profits.
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in the environment (Gilsing et al., 2008; Rowley et al., 2000). Specifically, firms operating
in rapidly changing environments will benefit from open network positions, which aid in
exploration, while firms in stable environments will benefit from closed network positions,
which aid in exploitation.
This link between network positions and learning modes suggests, as we observed, that open
and closed network positions affect firm performance distinctly, with closed positions reducing
firm performance variation, and open positions increasing it. Closed network positions should
therefore benefit firms when the population-level performance distribution favors low firm
performance variation, and open network positions when the distribution favors high firm
performance variation.
Following March (1991), we proposed that right-skewed distributions of possible outcomes
favor firms occupying variance-increasing open network positions in pooled cross-sectional
competition for high performance. Over time, however, because high variance also increases
exposure to poor outcomes, mean performance for firms sustaining open network positions
declines with the right-skewness of the population-level performance distribution. Moreover,
because variance-reducing closed network positions provide protection against poor outcomes,
the performance benefit of sustaining a closed network position over time increases with the
right-skewness of the population-level performance distribution.
To examine these predictions, we designed our model to permit variation in the disrup-
tiveness of the innovation regime – from incremental to radical – in order to alter the right-
skewness of the distribution of possible performance outcomes. The possibility of large size
innovations generates a right-skewed distribution of possible performance outcomes in which
firms occupying open network positions should achieve higher performance in pooled cross-
section. In contrast, if only incremental innovations are possible, variance-reducing closed
network positions should produce higher performance in cross-section. These predictions are
consistent with arguments and pooled cross-section findings in empirical studies of network
effects (e.g., Gilsing et al., 2008; Rowley et al., 2000), and our results support them. Our
analysis thus identifies performance variability as a general mechanism that can potentially
account for the observed empirical findings on firm performance in pooled cross-section.
The results also support the within-firm, over time prediction for both open and closed
network positions. Thus, while the correlations for betweenness in pooled cross-section in-
crease with the skewness of the population-level performance distribution, the within-firm
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over time correlations for betweenness decline with this distribution’s skewness (see Figure
4). In contrast, the correlations for constraint in pooled cross-section decreased with the
skewness of the population-level performance distribution, while the within-firm over time
correlations for constraint increased with skewness (see Figure 5). Moreover, the results
were largely consistent with theoretical expectation underlying the prectictions that closed
positions reduce firm performance variation, while open positions increase it (see Figure 6).
Network strategy prescriptions drawn from the pooled cross-section correlations would
thus counsel firms to adopt open network strategies in high-skew innovation regimes where
population-level performance is also skewed, but correlations based on firms’ long-run strate-
gies indicate that this prescription is exactly opposite to the behavior of firms successful in the
long run. Analogously, network strategy prescriptions drawn from the pooled cross-section
correlations would imply firms adopt closed network strategies in low-skew innovation regimes
where population-level performance also exhibits low-skew, while correlations based on firms’
long-run strategies show that this prescription again directly contradicts the behavior of firms
successful in the long run.
Although we have focused here on the influential stream of research on network position
effects, the phenomenon we articulate is likely to be far more general, applying broadly to
firm characteristics (R&D intensity, for instance) that are likely to affect firm performance
through its variance rather than (or in addition to) its mean.
We began with the observation that, while intuitively appealing (and common), drawing
network strategy implications from empirical evidence of network performance effects in
pooled cross-section is not necessarily warranted. As we explained, this is because network
positions may influence both the mean and variance of firm performance. Although strategic
prescriptions are warranted if network effects observed empirically in pooled cross-section
reflect increases in mean firm performance, if network effects instead reflect increases in
firm performance variance, such prescriptions are warranted only if the increase in the odds
of achieving high performance are sufficient to compensate for the concomitant increase in
the odds of realizing poor performance. Our analysis suggests that network effects may
indeed reflect changes in firm performance variance, and moreover, that the increased odds
of achieving high performance in cross-section may be insufficient to compensate for the
concomitant increase in the odds of realizing poor performance over time. This suggests the
exercise of caution in drawing implications for network strategies.
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